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claiming the privilege, refusing to allow any testimony which
could possibly rebut his version. 25
From the above cases one could conclude that the Supreme
Court of North Dakota could find enough justification to imply the
waiver of the physician-patient privilege at the commencement of
an action in which an essential issue is the patient's physical con-
dition.
A party should not be allowed to pick and choose what evidence
shall be excluded by asserting the objection that certain testimony
is privileged. This may allow him to put forth the best evidence
while asserting this privilege to bar the other party from deter-
mining the truth of the claim and the nature and extent of the
injury. It is the opinion of the writer that the modern extension
of implying a waiver when a person places his physical condition
in issue by way of complaint, counterclaim, or affirmative defense
is both logical and equitable. This result does no harm to the policy
basis underlying the privilege, and therefore the waiver should be
recognized as effective.
DENNIS W. SCHURMAN
CRIMINAL LAW-DEFENSES-ENTRAPMENT-Defendant was con-
victed for possession of marihuana. The conviction resulted from
a police undercover agent inducing the defendant, through repeated
requests, to procure marihuana for the agent. The defendant intro-
duced the agent to a willing seller who sold the agent some mari-
hauna. Defendant facilitated the sale by passing the marihuana
from the seller to the agent, but neither received a share of the
drug nor profited by the exchange. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts affirmed the defendant's conviction of possession
and denied him the defense of entrapment stating, "his familiarity
with narcotics would hardly justify a conclusion of law that the de-
fendant was corrupted by the officer's conduct." Commonwealth v.
Harvard,-Mass.-, 253 N. E. 2d 346 (1969).
"Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by
an officer, and the procurement of its commission by one who
would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion,
or fraud of the officer."' 2 Though this definition appears to be
universally accepted, the difficulty of formulating a test to apply
1. Marihuana is the Mexican name for the annual herb, "cannabis sativa". The drug
prepared from the stems and leaves of the "cannabis sativa" plant is commonly referred
to as Marijuana, marajuana, maraguana, and marlahana. BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1119(rev. 4th ed. 1968).
2. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932) (separate opinion).
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entrapment has plagued both state and federal courts since the first
part of this centuryA The court in the instant case recognized for
the first time the defense of entrapment as a part of Massachusetts
law.4 In doing so the court chose to follow the so called "majority
test", which is used in the federal courts and in all but two of the
state courts.5 This comment will examine the desirability of the
"majority test" in application of the entrapment defense, and the
possibility of implementing a test which might be preferable to
the "majority test".
The majority test was first articulated in Woo Wai v. United
States.8 This case put forth the "origin of intent" test which in
essence says that where the origin of intent is in the government
agent and he induces the defendant to do criminal acts, public
policy demands that the criminality of such acts should not be
punished.7
The United States Supreme Court adopted the Woo Wai ap-
proach in Sorrells v. United States." Chief Justice Hughes, speak-
ing for the majority in the 5 to 4 decision, held entrapment to be a
valid defense where a government agent, posing as an old army
friend, had induced the defendant to procure whiskey for him."
The test announced by the Sorrells court is that in order to establish
entrapment, the conduct in question must be a result of the "crea-
tive activity" of law enforcement officers. 10 This test, generally ac-
cepted today, 1 provides that where entrapment has been estab-
lished, ". . . a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary
innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.'12 In determining
what is a trap, both the conduct of the government agent and the
conduct and predisposition of the defendant as bearing on his claim
of innocence may be examined. 3
Sorrells further defined the entrapment defense by stating,
"[a]rtifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those en-
gaged in criminal enterprises.' 4 Apparently, then, as long as the
police only take advantage of the defendant's "willingness and pre-
3. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 45 (2), at 138 (1961). See also Sherman v. United
.States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (concurring opinion) ; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435, 453 (1932) (separate opinion); DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Be-
sponsibility: Its History, Theory, and Application, 1 U. OF S.F. L. 1Ev. 243, 256 (1967).
4. Commonwealth v. Harvard, - Mass.- , 253 N.E.2d 346, 350 (1969).
5. See, Rotenburg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L.
REv. 871, 890 (1963). Tennessee has rejected the entrapment defense. See Goins v. State,
192 Tenn. 32, 237 S.W.2d 8, 12 (1951). New York has some authority rejecting the de-
fense of entrapment. See People v. Schacher, 47 N.Y.S.2d 871, (N.Y.C. Magis, Ct. 1944).
6. Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
7. Id. at 415, 416.
8. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 443 (1932).
9. Id. at 440.
10. Id. at 451.
11. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provo-
cateurs, 60 YALE L. J. 1091, 1106 (1951).
12. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
13. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
14. Id. at 441.
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disposition" to engage in criminal activities, there can be no entrap-
ment.
The question of artifice and stratagem in relation to inducement
by the officer was discussed fully in Sherman v. United States.'15
Sherman involved two narcotic addicts who had become friends
while undergoing treatment for their addiction. One of the addicts
was a government informer and succeeded in inducing the other,
through appeals to his sympathy, to obtain a quantity of heroin for
the informer. The court held this to be entrapment, reasoning that
it was necessary to distinguish between proper and improper in-
ducement."8 However, Sherman failed to define what it actually
meant by "inducement" other than reaffirming the "artifice and
stratagem" approach taken by Sorrells.17
Whatever "inducement" is, both state and federal courts have
uniformly held that it requires more than a mere request or offer. 8
The basis for this view appears to be that:
[O]ne who has committed a criminal act is not entitled to
be shielded from its consequence merely because he was in-
duced to do so by another. 19
A few courts have gone even further, holding that where the de-
fendant has been previously engaged in criminal activity, the in-
ducement can be greater and more deceptive. 20
Perhaps the most criticized element of the Sorrells test is that
part which puts the stress on a subjective standard.2 1 Under this
standard, the government is allowed to show the reasonableness of
its agents activities by introducing evidence tending to show the
defendants predisposition to criminal conduct. Past cases have al-
lowed such evidence as; prior federal and state convictions, '2 2
crimes for which the defendant was not convicted,2 8  defendants
reputation, 24 statements from other drug users,25 and the mere
possession of a narcotic drug. 26
The "prior predisposition" approach, which has received great-
est acceptance in the state courts, 27 would appear to restrict en-
trapment to cases where the crime was planned by the police and
the defendant was otherwise innocent. 28 This has the effect of
15. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
16. Id. at 373.
17. Id. at 372.
18. Trice v. United States, 211 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1954) ; Swallum v, United States,
39 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1930) ; Note Entrapment, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 1333, 1336 n 24 (1960).
19. Commonwealth v. Kutler, 173 Pa. Super. 153, 96 A.2d 160 (1953), citing Common-
wealth v. Wasson, 42 Pa. Super. 38, 54, 57 ( ).
20. Trice v. United States, 211 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1954).
21. Rotenburg, aupra note 5, at 897.
22. Demos v. United States, 205 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1953); Carlton V. United States,
198 F.2d 795, 797 (9th Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2nd Cir.
1933).
23. United States v. Johnson, 208 F.2d 404, 406 (2nd Cir. 1953); Heath v. United
States, 169 F.2d 100-7 (10th Cir. 1948).
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making the defendant and his past activities the focal point instead
of the conduct of the police in relation to the present charge. It is
no wonder that a number of writers have asked whether or not the
purpose for which entrapment was created is being fulfilled.2 9
The inequities that appear in the "majority test" have not
gone unchallenged. In each of the major Supreme Court decisions
involving entrapment,3 0 a minority of four justices advocated a test
that would produce a more objective result. Justice Frankfurter,
concurring in Sherman, aptly stated the objective:
[A] test that looks to the character and predisposition of
the defendant rather than the conduct of the police loses
sight of the underlying reason for the defense of entrap-
ment.2 1
The advocates of the objective test deem it irrelevant to
ask where the intent to commit the crime originates, because in all
these cases of entrapment, the crime originates with the police,
without whose inducement the particular crime would not have oc-
curred. 2 Taking the view that entrapment was formulated to limit
police encouragement, not enhance it, the court under the objec-
tive test would look to the conduct of the police and the likelihood,
objectively considered, that it would entrap only those ready and
willing to commit crime.3 3 Therefore, regardless of the previous
infractions of the defendant, the instigation and creation of a new
crime to entrap the defendant would not be justified.34 The Sher-
man minority put it this way:
Human nature is weak enough and sufficiently beset by
temptations without government adding to them and generat-
ing crime.8 5
Although none of the state or federal courts have adopted this
view, at least one state has moved to incorporate its principles.
The California Supreme Court in People v. Benford,36 though ad-
24. United States v. Siegel, 16 F.2d 134 (D.C.D. Minn. 1926).
25. Strader v. United States, 72 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1934).
26. United States v. Pappagoda, 288 F. 214 (D.C.D. Conn. 1923).
27. Rotenburg, supra note 5, at 892 n 67.
28. Rotenburg, supra note 5, at 892.
29. Donnelly, supra note 11; Mikell, The Doctrte of Entrapment in the Federal
Courts, 90 U. OF PA. L. R-v. 245 (1942); Rotenburg, supra note 5.
30. E.g., Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958); Sherman v. United States,
356 US. 369 (1958) ; Sorrelis v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
81. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (concurring opinion).
32. Id.
83. Id. at 384.
34. Id. at 383.
35. Id. at 384.
36. People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 345 P.2d 928 (1959), ;
477
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herring to the Sorrells test, 8 7 ruled that in cases involving entrap-
ment:
[E]vidence that defendant had previously committed similar
crimes or had the reputation of being engaged in the com-
mission of such crimes or was suspected by the police of
criminal activities is not admissible. 8
Admittedly, this is not complete objectivity, but Benford at
least eliminates the "predisposition" aspect of the "majority test"
and probably represents the greatest deviation from the majority
view that can be found among the states.3 9
One of the most critical opponents of the "majority test", is
Professor Richard Donnelly of Yale Law School.4 0 He contends that
if the subjective orientated "majority test" really meant what it
said, a defendant could never be convicted of a police created ac-
tivity.41 Therefore the subjective approach, in denying entrapment,
must overlook the notion of police created activity and concentrate
solely on the defendant's intent interpreted by his predisposition.4 2
In short, the "majority test" professes to examine the "creative
activity of the police", yet in practice fails to do so.43 The only
means to correct this inadequacy then, would be to direct the
courts inquiry solely at the propriety of the officers conduct. Thus,
the determining factor would be whether the officer's conduct
would tempt only the willing criminals.4 4 Furthermore, the courts
attention should be directed solely at the crime or activity that is
before the court, and if that activity shows entrapment, the de-
fendant should be acquitted.45 The reasoning Donnelly used in
reaching this conclusion is aptly reflected in a statement made
by Justice Holmes, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States:
. . .for my part, I think it a less evil that some criminals
escape than that the government should play an ignoble
part.4 6
The American Law Institute, reflecting the purposes of entrap-
ment, chose to adopt the "objective test" to be included in their
Model Penal Code. 47 Although the A. L. I. recommendation does
37. The Sorrells test was formulated by the majority In Sorrells and there termed
the "creative activity" test, but Is also known as the "origin of intent" test.
38. People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 345 P.2d 928, 935 (1959).
39. Note, Criminal Law: The Entrapment Doctrine as a Defense in Wisconsin, 52
MAIQ. L. RIv. 406, 408 (1969).
40. DeFeo, supra note 3, at 261; Rotenburg, supra note 5, at 893: 41 U. oF CoLO. L.
REv. 263 (1969).
41. Donnelly, supra note 11, at 1107.
42. Id. at 1103.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1114.
45. Id.
46. Olmstead v. United States, 277 iU, 438, 470 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
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not serve to bind anyone, it is indicative of the fact that a num-
ber of legal minds are concerned about the status of the law re-
garding entrapment.
The instant case illustrates the type of injustice that the ob-
jective view seeks to correct. Defendant was denied the defense of
entrapment solely on the grounds that his familiarity with drugs
justified any type of conduct by the police. In the words of the
court, borrowed from another decision: "[A]lthough the instant de-
fendant had to be played with a bit . . . he was willing to take the
bait. ' 48 It should be pointed out that the officer either saw or
phoned the defendant daily for nearly a month before obtaining any
drugs. Furthermore, the defendant only introduced the officer to a
willing seller. Yet the court chose to look solely to defendant's pre-
disposition, and to completely overlook the conduct of the police
agent. Evidence as to the defendant's past actions involving drugs
was considered in lieu of the actual transaction that had brought
defendant before the court.
It would appear that the objective view would provide a more
equitable result. A careful examination of the officer's conduct
might reveal the manner in which he approached the defendant
for over a month, the representations that the officer made, and the
extent of the friendship that produced the ultimate result, and con-
clude that this activity was the moving force of the defendant's con-
duct. Also, under the objective view, the court could have looked
solely to the activity in question, and not to the defendant's pre-
disposition. The words of Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Sher-
man, are suited to just this type of case:
Public confidence in the fair and honorable administration
of justice, upon which ultimately depends the rule of law, is
the transcending value at stake.49
In conclusion, if the doctrine of entrapment is to maintain a
place in criminal law, it is a matter of necessity that the courts
adopt the objective approach. North Dakota has yet to take a stand
on this question and is in an ideal position to incorporate the ob-
jective approach as North Dakota law. With the constant growth
of criminal statutes, both in North Dakota and other states, and
the apparent broadening of police power, entrapment stands as one
of the last protections the citizen has against the practices of the
government. Therefore, if entrapment is going to serve the purpose
for which it was intended, it must be changed to reflect that pur-
pose.
STEVE WOOD
47. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
48. Waker v. United States, 344 F.2d 795, 796 (1st Cir. 1965).
49. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 880 (1958) (concurring opinion).
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